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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of low-skilled immigration on the host country’s
education system, which is characterized by sources of school funding, expenditures
per pupil, and types of parents who are more likely to send children to publicly
(privately) funded schools. When the size of low-skilled immigrants is large, it is
found that wealthier natives are likely to opt out from public into private schools.
Four main eﬀects of immigration are taken into account: (1) greater congestion
in public school; (2) lower average tax base for education funding; (3) reduced
low-skilled wage and so more low-skilled natives’ dependence on public education;
(4) higher skill premium, which induces high-skilled natives to privately invest
in their children’s education and hence weakens their support to ﬁnance public
school. The theoretical predictions are not at odds with cross-country stylized
facts revealed in both micro and macro data. Moreover, with endogenous fertility,
the opting-out decision taken by some native parents results in the empirically
observed fertility diﬀerential between natives and immigrants.
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I would support [the 19th century-style unlimited immigration] if we lived in
the 19th century world where government spending was tiny. But govern-
ments now spend huge amounts on medical care, retirement, education, and
other beneﬁts and entitlements.
– Gary Becker, in ”Sell the Right to Immigrate” (2005).
Immigration, particularly the inﬂow of low-skilled individuals, often causes the concern
of natives that immigrants with low earning potentials could become a heavy burden on
the social welfare system.1 Public education, as an important redistribution mechanism
designed to facilitate social mobility for the upcoming generations, can not but be part
of the immigration debate. On the supply side, immigrant workers contribute to tax
revenues that can be used to ﬁnance public schooling in the destination country. Yet on
the demand side, children of immigrants generally have equal access to public resources
oﬀered in public school.2 The aim of this paper is to study how low-skilled immigrants,
through their supply of taxes and demand for public education, impacts education sys-
tem in the destination country. We claim that, by altering schooling choices of native
parents for their oﬀspring, an increasing stock of low-skilled immigrants may lead to a
more segregated education system, where native children from wealthy families attend
privately funded school with better education quality. Our predictions echo the empir-
ical evidence in the United States that immigration induces ”native ﬂight” from public
1Facchini and Mayda (forthcoming) ﬁnd that, in countries where natives are on average more skilled
than immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences after con-
trolling for education. This evidence is consistent with the authors’ theoretical conjecture that wealthier
natives in a welfare state are concerned by the potentially increasing scale of income redistribution due
to the arrival of immigrants.
2For instance, California’s 1994 Proposition 187, a narrowly-passedballot initiative to limit the access
of immigrants to public education, was declared unconstitutional by federal judge Mariana Pfaelzer in
a March 1998 ruling (see Petronicolos and New (1999)). Nevertheless, each state can still manage
extracurricular and tutorial services as long as it provides a basic education.
1into private school (Betts and Fairlie 2003). They are also consistent with cross-country
stylized facts regarding migration and education. The major contribution of our paper
is to provide a solid theoretical argument for the mechanism behind.
By education system, we refer to the combination of three educational outcomes: 1)
how schools are funded, from public or private sources, 2) expenditures per pupil in
public and in private schools, and 3) types of parents who are more likely to send
children to public (private) school. We argue that native parents foresee that, with more
low-skilled immigration, resources per pupil in public school are decreased because the
average tax base is reduced by an increased population with lower wages. As parents
are concerned of children’s educational achievement, wealthier parents choose to opt
out of publicly funded education and send their children to private school where they
have to pay out of their own pockets. The reduced participation in public schools has
ambiguous eﬀects: on one hand, with some native children leaving public education
the stress put on school resources by low-skilled immigration is alleviated; on the other
hand, parents who opt out become ”double-taxed” for the education of their children,
so they tend to be reluctant in supporting taxation for public education.3 However, if
the number of low-skilled immigrants gets larger, more parents will opt out and public
school resources per pupil will surely decline when compared to the initial level. At the
aggregate level, it turns out that a larger proportion of low-skilled immigrants among the
whole population at destination is associated with a more segregated education regime,
where children of wealthier parents are more likely to attend private school and enjoy
better school resources whereas students from poorer families, including those with low-
skilled immigrant parents, stay behind in public school. Finally, a pure private regime
3See, for example, Shapiro (1986) where some arguments are discussed for using public funding to
subsidize private schools. One of them is ”double taxation” for those parents who send children to
private school. This very argument is indeed used by several interest groups that support private school
vouchers.
2is always possible with low-skilled immigration if there is not a suﬃciently high legal
minimum to regulate public education expenditures.
We focus in particular on low-skilled immigration based on two considerations. First,
developed economies generally possess the most comprehensive public education system;
in the meantime, they are also destinations where large numbers of low-skilled migrant
workers arrive. Hence, low-skilled immigrants are matter-of-factly a very relevant com-
ponent in the local labor market and to a certain degree aﬀect the constitution and
distribution of tax revenues.4 Second, children who are most critically needed to be
integrated in the school system are generally those whose parents do not speak the in-
struction language at destination, and these parents are most likely to be low-skilled
immigrants.
As already mentioned, the arrival of immigrants may aﬀect education policy through
voting support for public education. In practice, immigrants are not immediately granted
voting rights, to which only citizens are entitled, and obtaining citizenship can take
several years or longer. However, immigrants can soon inﬂuence native voters’ preferred
education policy at least through two channels. First of all, as argued earlier, immigrants
have contrasting impacts on the demand and the supply for public resources in education.
As voters take into account the fact that they have to share with immigrants both the
beneﬁts and the burdens of public intervention in education, their preferred education
policy is likely to be aﬀected (Sand and Razin 2006). Second, immigrants may alter
the characteristics of the electorate even though they are not part of it. This second
channel works through eﬀects on income distribution among the electors. Theoretically
and supported by some empirical evidence, an increase in the low-skilled proportion
4Betts and Lofstrom (1998) ﬁnd that the immigrants’ level of education relative to the natives’ has
declined over the two decades before 1990. Borjas (1995) documents that, in the U.S. Census, about
37% of immigrants in both 1980 and 1990 were high school dropouts, compared to just 23% of natives
in 1980 and 15% of natives in 1990.
3of workforce could imply a higher skill premium.5 With their increased income, high-
skilled parents are likely to prefer better education for their children. When public
schools fail to provide their desired quality of education, these parents will choose to opt
out, which in turn aﬀects the voting outcome over the funding for public schools. Notice
that an increased skill premium due to low-skilled immigration is not required in order
for the mechanism to deliver the above-mentioned predictions; rather, it reinforces the
mechanism as low-skilled parents grow more dependent on public education.
This paper follows de la Croix and Doepke (2007) in incorporating endogenous fertil-
ity to study schooling choices. It is well documented that parents are faced with a
quantity-quality trade-oﬀ for their children, which is to say, the amount of educational
expenditures that parents desire to spend on their children are negatively correlated to
the number of children they would like to have (Becker and Barro 1988). If the oppor-
tunity cost of having children is higher for high-skilled parents, they might decide to
have less children but educate them better. Accordingly, fertility diﬀerentials may arise
among parents with diﬀerent levels of income. In this respect, the arrival of low-skilled
immigrants implies an increase in the size of population possibly featuring higher fer-
tility rate and an increase in the opportunity cost of fertility for high-skilled workers as
their wage goes up. Notice that we do not assume any exogenous diﬀerence in fertility
behavior between natives and immigrants. Such culturally-based diﬀerences might exist
in reality but they would only strengthen our main conclusions. We simply assume that
low-skilled immigrants are slightly less productive than natives, to reﬂect at least the
adjustment costs of migration.6
5For example, Mayda (2006) ﬁnds that skilled individuals tend to favor immigration in countries
where immigrants are relatively less skilled than natives, which is consistent with the story of rising
skill premium. However, it is still an unsettled issue whether low-skilled immigrants in fact adversely
aﬀect wages of their native counterpart (see Card (2005) for the survey of this literature).
6Adjustment costs of migration is an assumption often used in characterizing immigrants in theoret-
ical model; meanwhile, their existence is also supported by empirical studies. See, for example, Batista
(2008).
4As several elements are entwined in the model, it is important to set a timing structure
for the events. First, parents choose the optimal number of children consistent with
their expected schooling choices for their oﬀspring. Second, natives vote over the ad
valorem income tax rate and public expenditures per pupil. Finally, in accordance with
the education policy implemented, each household chooses the type of school where they
would like their children to be educated. Since perfect foresight is assumed throughout
the model, parents’ expected schooling choices for their children must coincide with their
a posteriori choices. This timing of events is motivated with reasonable considerations:
fertility decisions usually take place before educational choices are made, and educa-
tional choices occur in a given framework of education regime that is shaped by the
contemporary education policy.7
We begin by relating our contribution to previous streams of literature in Section 2.
Section 3 describes stylized facts concerning migration and relevant variables for educa-
tion system in the destination country. Section 4 formally presents the model economy,
then we depict each education regime and its existence conditions in Section 5. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
This work relates to several streams of literature. First of all, we refer to the literature of
quantity-quality trade-oﬀ, which highlights the interlink between fertility and education
decisions (Becker and Barro 1988; de la Croix and Doepke 2003; de la Croix and Doepke
2004; Tamura 1994). When fertility is endogenous, parents who prefer higher quality of
their oﬀspring may choose to have less children for a given amount of resources to be
7de la Croix and Doepke (2007) consider both this same timing and another timing with educational
choices committed before voting. They ﬁnd that the quality of public school is lower or equal when
parents make their schooling choices after the determination of policy variables.
5devoted to child rearing. Therefore, when education regimes are to be compared, the
decisions on fertility and education should be considered jointly.
The structure of our model follows de la Croix and Doepke (2007), who show that
in democracies a public regime tends to be established unless income distribution is
too unequal, whereas in non-democracies, a multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Our
model diﬀers by including in the economy low-skilled immigrants who do not vote but
contribute to the demand and the supply for public education.8 In addition, we remove
the assumption of a linear production technology thus allowing for a distributional eﬀect
of low-skilled immigration, which endogenously raises skill premium and impacts the
income distribution of the electorate. We also consider explicitly the adjustment costs
of migration, which negatively aﬀect the productivity of immigrants so that they receive
a lower net wage than low-skilled natives do. Therefore, the only diﬀerences between
low-skilled natives and low-skilled immigrants are with respect to voting rights and
wages.
As policy variables have redistributive eﬀects, this paper also relates to the literature as-
sociating income redistribution, voting, and education policy. Whereas standard models
of publicly provided private goods demonstrate a mechanism of redistribution that is
from the rich to the poor (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980), following works suggest a reverse
direction (Johnson 1984; B´ enabou 2000). In particular, Fern´ andez and Rogerson (1995)
model education as a good that is only partially publicly provided through a subsidy
voted by the agents. Such a framework is able to generate the outcome that education
of the rich is in fact subsidized by the poor who cannot aﬀord the remaining (private)
costs of education as long as income distribution is suﬃciently unequal. In other words,
8de la Croix and Doepke (2007) consider the case of unequal distributed political power where some
electors are more determinant than others for the ﬁnal outcome in order to study the implications for
non-democracies. Our framework shares with it the asymmetry in voting power of agents, but not of
electors: in other words, we introduce a further category of agents (immigrants) who cannot vote and
whose size of population changes relative to the native population.
6there emerges the - maybe counter intuitive, but empirically supported (Bishop 1977;
Peltzman 1973) - result that redistributive policies tend to beneﬁt the education of the
rich thus exacerbating inequality. Diﬀerently from Fern´ andez and Rogerson (1995), our
model does not impose a unique education regime but makes it endogenously determined.
Hence, while it is the rich who redistribute to the poor, the scale of redistribution varies
with diﬀerent regimes. In contrast to many works in the literature assume a majority
voting mechanism, we follow de la Croix and Doepke (2007) in adopting probabilistic
voting for the determination of education policy. The voting outcome is equivalent to a
smooth aggregation of preferences among all the electorate, so it is not the median voter
but the whole distribution of voters that contributes to policy-making.
Our work is also related to the literature studying the eﬀect of migration on social policy
at destination (Borjas 1994; Benhabib 1996; Sand and Razin 2006). Razin, Sadka, and
Swagel (2002) study the eﬀect of migration on redistributive policies, by developing a
model of low-skilled migration and human capital formation. They consider two con-
trasting eﬀects of migration. On one hand, immigrants support the coalition claiming
for greater redistribution, but on the other hand, voters know that they have to share
tax revenues with immigrants. This latter eﬀect, known as ”ﬁscal leakage”, may dom-
inate and imply a lower tax rate with low-skilled immigration. In other words, even
when the median voter is a low-skilled native, s/he will prefer less redistribution due to
the fact that public resources are diluted with low-skilled immigration. In contrast, our
model assumes that immigrants are not entitled to vote, but their children cannot be
excluded from attending pubic school. With probabilistic voting, we also predict that
low-skilled immigration may result in a lower tax rate to ﬁnance public education, but
the reasoning behind is the so-called ”double taxation”.
As already mentioned, Betts and Fairlie (2003) ﬁnd evidence that the inﬂux of immi-
grants makes natives parents more prone to send their children to private school at the
7secondary level of education. Using the U.S. Metropolitan Areas for 1980 and 1990,
they estimate that for every four immigrants who arrive in public high schools, there
is one native student who switches to private school. While some have suggested that
such a result may be related to racial prejudice of the natives (Conlon and Kimenyi
1991) and others to lower expected attainment in public school through the so-called
”peer-group” channel (Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau 1978) or bad-signaling
of academic quality, our model is able to provide a theoretical ground to the authors’
conjecture that, by increasing the pressure on resources in public schools, the arrival of
immigrants induces more native parents to opt out in favor of private schools; thus, it
also lowers voters’ support for public education funding. In this respect, the choice of
focusing on low-skilled immigration is supported by the ﬁnding that ”native ﬂight” is
more pronounced for white natives responding to immigrant children who do not speak
English at home and thus more likely to come from low-skilled households.
Betts and Fairlie (2003) do not ﬁnd ”native ﬂight” at the primary school level, possibly
due to neighborhood eﬀects. These eﬀects can be rather signiﬁcant for an education
ﬁnancing system, such as in the U.S., where public schools are largely funded by local
property taxes. This may lead to rather heterogeneous public school quality across
communities, i.e. richer (poorer) districts have better- (worse-) funded public schools
(B´ enabou 1996; Fern´ andez and Rogerson 1996; Fern´ andez 2002). Therefore, native ﬂight
into private schools is more likely to occur in a state funded system, where public schools
are more homogeneous in terms of ﬁnancial resources.9 Despite these arguments, the
evidence provided by Betts and Fairlie (2003) at the secondary school level implies that
residential segregation is of less importance when it comes to high school education.10 In
9In a community funded system, however, native ﬂight may be in the form of residential segregation
in lieu of lower attendance in public school.
10Betts and Fairlie (2003) argue that native ﬂight is observed at the secondary school level for several
reasons. We ﬁnd the most pertinent to be the fact that the U.S. high schools usually have several
primary and middle schools as ”feeders”, and thus, residential segregation is less likely to imply schooling
8contrast to the literature that studies sorting and education, we abstract from modeling
neighborhood eﬀects but allow for sorting into public and private schools, as in de la
Croix and Doepke (2007).
3 Cross-Country Stylized Facts
In addition to the empirical evidence provided by Betts and Fairlie (2003) that immi-
gration is associated with natives opting out of public secondary schools in the U.S., we
put forward in this section some cross-country stylized facts, which in general are in ac-
cordance with our theoretical predictions. In the ﬁrst part, we present some correlations
using aggregated country data from the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) and from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). The second part takes advantage of the micro data collected
by the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), 2003.11
3.1 Macro Data: UNESCO and OECD
How does immigration appear to be related with education system at the macro level?
Although a detailed empirical investigation of this issue goes far beyond the purpose
of this work, it is however useful to present some stylized facts in order to address the
correlations between changes in immigration and in variables related to the education
system of destination countries.
In Figure 3, changes in the attendance rate of publicly funded schools are plotted against
changes in the share of foreign-born population. The correlation turns out to be negative.
segregation even though it may be the case for primary schools. In response to immigration, native
parents may ﬁnd it more attractive to educate children in private schools in the neighborhood than
moving to another community.
11See Appendix A for data descriptions.
9Since more immigration appears to be associated with a shift from public to private
education, we should observe also a positive correlation of immigration with the private
share of education expenditure, as well as with the amount spent on private education.
The former conjecture ﬁnds support in Figure 4, which plots changes in the private share
of education funding; the latter is veriﬁed in Figure 5 where the growth of the absolute
level of private expenditures is considered. With regard to the public expenditure in
education, we take advantage of the UNESCO and Docquier-Marfouk (2006) datasets.
Here, a negative relationship is observed in Figure 6 between low-skilled immigration
and public expenditures per pupil (as percentage of GDP per capita).
Certainly, these graphs cannot - and are not meant to - provide a deﬁnitive answer,
but they seem to suggest a consistent story: more immigration tends to be associated
with a shift of pupils and resources into private schools so that the weight of private
expenditures in education increases. If this is true, we should observe that, ceteris
paribus, countries with a larger proportion of immigrants exhibit lower participation rates
in public schools. We test this conjecture by dividing countries into four groups according
to the percentile distribution of participation in public schools. In both year 2000 and
year 2005, we observe that the average share of immigrants out of total population is
decreasing as we pass from a group of countries with a lower participation rate to one
with a higher participation rate. Further, the mean of immigrants’ share is larger, at the
90% signiﬁcant level, for the group with the lowest attendance rate than for the group
with the highest rate (see Tables 1 and 2).12
In a similar vein, we conduct a mean-diﬀerence test for the hypothesis that countries
experiencing negative changes in public expenditures per pupil are those with larger
12It is checked that no country is inﬁnitesimally excluded from a group. The use of of equal variance
assumption is conﬁrmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which can not reject such an hypothesis.
Results are robust to other criteria for dividing the groups, such as quintiles or considering in one
group all the countries with a full public system and in the opposite group those with less than a 95%
attendance rate.
10increases in the low-skilled immigrants’ share of population. The one-tailed diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant at 95% for primary schools and 90% for secondary schools (see Table 3).13
Moreover, when we investigate the correlation between changes in the share of immi-
grants with tertiary education and lagged changes in public expenditures per pupil, we
observe ﬂat slopes at all school levels. This implies that the negative correlation is in-
deed associated with immigrants characterized by lower skill/education. As a robustness
check, we also study the correlation between pupil-teacher ratio and changes in immi-
grant share by educational attainment. Although the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant
possibly due to less observations, the results conform to those shown with changes in
public expenditures per pupil.
3.2 Micro Data: PISA 2003
In this part, we use micro data collected by PISA in 2003. The primary sampling unit
is an individual 15-year-old student, and the main variable of our interest is the share
of public funding for the school that a student attends. Three types of students are
identiﬁed for 35 countries, including immigrant students with low-skilled parents, native
students with low-skilled parents and native students with high-skilled parents.14
Table 4 presents the average public share of school funding for each type of students
by country.15 Figure 7 plots all 35 countries according to their average shares of public
funding and the variations of the share of public funding across types of students within
each country. It is observed that there are approximately three clusters of countries. We
deﬁne countries with lower than 60% of average shares as in the private regime. They
13Betts and Fairlie (2003) ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of ”native ﬂight” only for secondary but not for
primary schools.
14See Appendix A.2 for details of classiﬁcation.
15We follow the PISA 2003 Data Analysis Manual (OECD, 2005) in the computation of means,
standard errors on the mean and the conﬁdence intervals.
11are Indonesia, Mexico, Macao-China and Turkey, all characterized by low public shares
of school funding for each type of students. On the other hand, we ﬁnd there is a cluster
of countries with variation less than 3% and high average public shares of school funding.
We deﬁne these countries as in the public regime. Most of them are the Scandinavian
countries or belong to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The rest of the
countries are deﬁned as in the segregation regime, with those carrying variations larger
than 10% as severely segregated.
What we ﬁnd the most interesting is that for all countries listed in the segregation
regime, except for Tunisia, we observe that native students with high-skilled parents
attend schools with the lowest average public share of total funding, or, in other words,
they are more likely to attend private schools than the other types of students.16
Next, we combine PISA 2003 with the Docquier-Marfouk (2006) dataset in order to take
advantage of the information about skills of immigrants by destination. At the end, we
have data on immigration stocks for eight countries listed under the public regime (Czech
Republic, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden)
and 12 countries under the segregation regime (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland and the United
States). Table 5 provides the average values and the average ten-year changes of low
skilled immigrants (measured either as stocks or as shares of total population) for public
and segregation regimes, distinguishing two possible classiﬁcations of ”low-skill”: less
than secondary or less than tertiary education. In the last row, the correlations be-
tween the segregation regime and immigration variables are provided. We ﬁnd that the
segregation regime is indeed positively correlated with both larger stocks and greater
16As a robustness check, we also look at the average public share of school funding of students who
speak a foreign language at home and those who speak at home the test language, i.e. the language in
which school tests are conducted. We ﬁnd that, for most of the countries, those who speak a foreign
language at home attend schools with a higher average share of school funding coming from public
sources.
12changes of low-skilled immigrants, with whichever measure considered. Although corre-
lations are generally non-signiﬁcant largely because of the small sample size, it is worth
highlighting that signiﬁcance is obtained for the positive correlation of segregation with
the change in the share of low-skilled (less than secondary education) immigrants, thus
supporting that an increase in the relative size of low-skilled immigrants indeed tends
to be associated with segregation in education regime.
All these pieces of evidence seem to corroborate the idea that there exists a link between
low-skilled immigration and the education system. In Section 4, consistently with what
has been observed in the data, we put forward a general equilibrium model of rational
expectations and voting, which predicts that a larger size of low-skilled immigration
makes a public regime less likely to be an equilibrium as more parents send their children
into private school.
4 Model Economy
In this section, we assess the building blocks of our model economy. Let us begin with
household decisions, then we move to the production sector and ﬁnally to the political
mechanism.
4.1 Households
The economy is populated by households who have identical preferences over consump-
tion c, the number of children n and children’s human capital κ. Part of the popula-
tion is composed of immigrants (M). Natives are either high-skilled (H) or low-skilled
(L). Since we focus on low-skilled immigration, we assume that all immigrants are





i)], i = {M,L,H} (1)
The parameter γ > 0 captures the weight of child-caring in the household utility, whereas
η ∈]0,1[ denotes the relative taste for child quality when compared to the quantity
of children.18 Notice that no exogenous diﬀerence in preferences is imposed between
immigrants and natives.19
Each household is endowed with one unit of time. Raising one child is assumed to cost
a fraction φ ∈]0,1[ of parents’ time so that the opportunity cost of having children
is higher for parents with greater earning potentials. In addition, human capital is
acquired through formal education, which incurs a pecuniary cost. Parents may choose
to educate their children in public school so that κi = s, where s denotes the quality of
public school ﬁnanced by general income taxation, or in private school such that κi = ei,
where ei denotes the quality of education purchased by parents on the private schooling
market. Assuming that private education expenses are tax non-deductible, we write the
household budget constraint as below:20









1 if κi = ei
0 if κi = s
(2)
17Alternatively we can say that immigrants, though high-skilled, can have access only to low skill job.
18It is constrained to be lower than one to guarantee the interior solution of parent’s optimization
problem.
19Sand and Razin (2006) assume a higher exogenous fertility rate for immigrants than for natives. If
we make a similarly assumption that immigrants have higher preferences for quantity over quality (i.e.
a lower η for immigrants than for natives), it only strengthen our results.
20Regulations vary from country to country on tax deduction of private school expenses. We assume
non-deductibility bearing in mind that expenses paid for private elementary and secondary education
in the United States are generally tax-nondeductible; de la Croix and Doepke (2007) assume instead
full deductibility. The main diﬀerence is that, when private education expenses are tax deductible, the
choice between quality and quantity of child-caring is not aﬀected by taxation. However, the qualitative
result maintains valid that low-skilled immigration may cause natives to opt out of public education.
14where τ ∈]0,1[ is the ad valorem income tax rate that raises government revenue to
ﬁnance public education. Notice that enrolling in public schools is free of charge, and
that parents opting for private schooling have to pay for the full expenses to educate
their children in a private school. It is assumed that the costs of school quality per unit
are unity.
The timing of events is as follows. First, each household makes their fertility decision,
consistent with the expected schooling choice for their oﬀspring. Next, natives vote over
an ad valorem income tax rate and public school expenditures per pupil; consequently,
the outcome of the voting stage determines the quality of public education. Measuring
between the determined public school quality and their desired quality of education for
oﬀspring, each household (both natives and immigrants) then makes the ﬁnal decision on
whether to educate their children in public schools that are free of charge or in private
schools where parents pay for children’s education out of their own pockets. Perfect
foresight is assumed for all individual decisions.
Before addressing the labor market block of the model, it is convenient to show the
results of fertility decision by maximizing (1) subject to (2). Parents anticipating public
schooling, i.e. [κi]
e = s, choose the following fertility rate ˆ n:





As expected, fertility is increasing in the child-caring parameter γ and decreasing in the
time cost of child-rearing φ. On the other hand, parents anticipating private schooling
choose ˜ n with the expectation [κi]
e = ei:










15One can immediately observe the following lemma
Lemma 1 (Fertility Diﬀerential) Parents who anticipate private schooling choose to
have less children when compared to those who anticipate public schooling.
˜ n < ˆ n
Proof: This inequality is immediately proved by comparing equations (3) and (4). ￿
The intuition behind is that, given identical homothetic preferences, each household
has the same optimal rule of allocation to distribute resources between child-caring
and consumption.21 Those parents who anticipate public schooling are faced only with
opportunity costs (in terms of working time) when having children since there is no direct
costs associated with children’s education. In comparison, parents anticipating private
schooling expect to pay for the full expenses for their children to acquire human capital,
and therefore, these parents reduce their opportunity costs by having less children. This
is why the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ parameter η only appears in ˜ n.
The private education spending ei is increasing in the taste for children’s human capital
η, in household income wi and in the time cost of child-rearing φ. The last result is so
because, when child-rearing becomes more time-consuming, having one additional child
is relatively more expensive than providing better education for the children who are
already born. Further, it is observed that ei is decreasing in the tax rate τ due to our tax
non-deductibility assumption. In other words, making private education tax deductible
will lead to a higher quality of private schooling in our model. Similarly, any policy tool
21More precisely, the total resources available to a household are the unity time endowment evaluated
at the market wage, or wi. Due to homothetic utility, the share of resources devoted to consumption is
constant, i.e. 1−τ
1+γ.
16that is made to reduce tuition and other charges of private education will have the eﬀect
of increasing the incentive to opt out of public education.
4.2 Production
Let us now move to the labor market block of our economy. In order to capture the
potential eﬀect of low-skilled immigration on the skill premium, a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function is assumed with high- and low-skilled labor as imperfect substitutes
that are combined to produce a composite output with price of unity. Later on, it
will become clear that our theoretical predictions remain valid even if constant wages
rates are assumed. However, an increased skill premium with low-skilled immigration
reinforces the mechanism and speed up the transition of education system in the host
society. Additionally, it is assumed that immigrants bear adjustment costs of relocating
to the destination country.22 These costs are reﬂected in receiving lower wages than do
low-skilled natives, or technically speaking, in the parameter δ ∈]0,1[ which denotes
a lower productivity for low-skilled immigrants. This is the only exogenous diﬀerence
between a low-skilled immigrant and a low-skilled native, except for that immigrants
cannot vote.
Denote y as the amount of products, and h, l and m as total hours devoted to work
by high-skilled natives, low-skilled natives and low-skilled immigrants respectively. Pro-




22For our purposes, the assumption of adjustment costs basically works to imply lower wages for
immigrants. Evidence that immigrants receive ceteris paribus a lower wage than natives has been
found in several studies (Borjas 1994). Using the 1970 U.S.A. Census that, Chiswick (1978) estimates
that an immigrant at the time of arrival is rewarded 17% less of wage than is a native.
17Under perfect competition, y = mwM + lwL + hwH with
w
















 α−1 . (8)
Without loss of generality, we normalize the number of low-skilled natives to 1, and
express the ratio of high- to low-skilled natives by ξ, and the ratio of immigrants to
low-skilled natives by  . Moreover, the total hours devoted to work for each household
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L(1 − φˆ n) + (1 − ψ
L)(1 − φ˜ n)
 
(10)
m =  
 
ψ
M(1 − φˆ n) + (1 − ψ
M)(1 − φ˜ n)
 
(11)
with ψi denoting the share of parents type i who anticipate to educate children in public
schools. The following restrictions are imposed: ξ ∈]0,(
α(1+δµ)
(1−α)(1+γη))[ and   ∈ [0,1]. The
former condition is made to ensure skill premium by assuming that high-skilled labor is
always scarcer.23 The latter restriction avoids the implausible outcome that there are
more low-skilled immigrants than low-skilled natives, but it can be easily relaxed.24 It
is hence implied that wM = δwL < wL < wH.25








24One can think that µ itself may be aﬀected by education system in the receiving country. For the
sake of simplicity, we consider µ as exogenous in a partial equilibrium set-up.
25Alternatively, we could have had introduced a skill productivity parameter which would have also
guaranteed that high-skilled workers receive higher wages. For the sake of parsimony, we impose simply
that reasonable restriction on ξ.
184.3 Political Mechanism
As explained in Section 1 we assume that public school quality s and the proportional
income tax rate τ are determined via probabilistic voting, as it displays convenient
properties that take into account all distributions of preferences. It can be proved
that the political outcome under probabilistic voting corresponds to implementing the
following social welfare function Ω:26
Ω[τ,s] = ξ[ψ
H ˆ U




L + (1 − ψ
L)˜ U
L] (12)
where ˆ Ui and ˜ Ui denote respectively the (indirect) utility of native parents of type i who
anticipate public schooling (ni = ˆ n and [κi]
e = s) and of those who anticipate private
schooling (ni = ˜ n and [κi]
e = ei). The maximization of Ω[τ,s] is constrained to the
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M(1 − φˆ n) + (1 − ψ
M)(1 − φ˜ n)
  





L +  ψ
M  
.
From this maximization problem we have the following lemma:
26See de la Croix and Doepke (2007) also for further details on probabilistic voting mechanism.




γ η(ξ ψH + ψL)
(1 + γ η)(1 + ξ)
(13)






∂ξ < 0 if ψH < ψL;
∂τ∗
∂ξ = 0 if ψH = ψL
• ∂τ∗
∂ψH = ξ ∂τ∗
∂ψL > 0




ˆ n(ξ ψH + ψL +  ψM)
(14)
Proof: Equations (13) and (14) results from the ﬁrst order conditions of maximization.
Since Ω[τ,s] is a sum of concave utilities and the constraint is linear in s and τ, the
second order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed. In order for equation (13) to represent
a tax rate, it has to satisfy τ∗ ∈ [0,1]. The fact that τ∗ is non-negative is immediate.
To prove it is no greater than 1, notice that it can be decomposed as the product of




1+ξ with ψi ∈ [0,1]. The
comparative statics are obtained by taking derivatives of Equation (13). ￿
Intuitively, the tax rate depends positively on the propensities to spend for children, γ
and η, and on native parents’ anticipated participation in public school, ψH and ψL.
Moreover, if the share of high-skilled natives anticipating public schooling is lower than
the low skilled natives’ (as it will be shown to be always the case unless the shares
are equal), then an increase in the relative size of high-skilled natives, ξ, will lead to
20a lower tax rate. The reason is that parents who anticipate private schooling support
less redistribution through public education provision, from which their children do not
beneﬁt. Hence, whenever ψH < ψL, an increase in ξ implies a larger proportion of the
electorate who favor smaller redistribution.
Inspecting equation (14), one can see that at the denominator lies the total number
of children expected to attend public school; thus, for a given amount of tax revenues,
higher expected participation in public school (ψi) leads to a lower public school quality.
Moreover, since y = hwH + lwL + mwM with h, l and m deﬁned in equations (9),
(10) and (11), higher expected participation in public school also results in a lower
tax base because parents who anticipate public schooling give birth to more children,
which requires more time devoted to child-rearing and less to work. Nevertheless, the
income tax rate is as above-mentioned increasing in natives’ anticipated participation in
public education. While the expected participation of immigrant children unambiguously
lowers public school quality ceteris paribus, the expected participation of native children
induces contrasting eﬀect. Finally, an increase in the size of low-skilled immigrants ( )
positively contributes to public school quality through an increased tax base (a positive
eﬀect on the supply side); however, it lowers public school quality when children of new
immigrants attend public schools (a negative eﬀect on the demand side, or the congestion
eﬀect).27
Notice that the voted tax rate is not directly aﬀected by the size of low-skilled immi-
grants, nor by the share of them anticipating public schooling. In fact,   and ψM only
aﬀect the quality of public school. This occurs because the socially determined tax rate
reﬂects aggregated preferences of natives over the allocation of income between con-
sumption and child-caring. With the assumed homothetic utility function in equation
27As it will be shown later, all children of low-skilled immigrants go to publicly funded schools as
long as natives still support public expenditures for education.
21(1), this rule of allocation is not altered by the income level but determined by prefer-
ences and electorate composition.28 Denote Γ =
γη
1+γη ∈]0,1[, it can be regarded as the
weight that a society places upon education as opposed to consumption. Indeed, if all
voters expect public education, the voted tax rate corresponds exactly to Γ. However,
as long as there are some native parents anticipating to opt out of public education and
to choose private schooling, the tax rate decreases accordingly since these parents do
not expect to beneﬁt from public schools and thus tend to vote for a lower tax rate.
In Section 5, we will show how low-skilled immigration alters native parents’ schooling
expectation; that is to say,   and ψM enter indirectly into the voted tax rate τ∗.
4.4 Equilibria
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibria. Up to now, ψi has been dealt with
as an exogenous parameter that reﬂects the share of parents type i anticipating public
schooling. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, parents’ expected schooling choices
will coincide with their a posteriori decisions, i.e. ψi is eﬀectively the public school
participation rate. Hence, at the equilibrium, parents’ preferences and the education
regime are mutually consistent.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium) A set of public school participation rates {ψH,ψL,ψM},
a set of policy variable {s∗,τ∗} and a set of households variables {ˆ ni, ˜ ni,ei} constitutes
28Indeed, it is noticed that the technology parameter α and the adjustment costs δ, which aﬀect
wages, play no role in determining the tax rate. In short, as long as the voted tax rate is independent
on wages, it is not aﬀected by µ either from the skill premium or from the tax base channels.
22an equilibrium if and only if:

    
    
ψi = 1 ⇔ ˆ Ui > ˜ Ui
ψi ∈ [0,1] ⇔ ˆ Ui = ˜ Ui
ψi = 0 ⇔ ˆ Ui < ˜ Ui
, ∀i.
The interpretation is that, given own fertility decision and the voting outcome, parents
then make the decision on the third event: educational choices for their oﬀspring, which
are in eﬀect the realization of self-fulﬁlling prophecy on anticipated schooling choices.
Since all households have the same preferences and parents of the same type receive the
same wage, parents of type i will all choose public education if it renders higher utility,
and the same goes for private education. However, when the resulting utility does not
diﬀer from one schooling choice to the other, some parents of type i will choose public
education while others pay for children’s education out of their own pocket.
In order to investigate further, we proceed as follows. First, we obtain from the govern-
ment budget balance and write the tax rate as a linear function in s:
τ(s) = s   T(ψ
H,ψ
L,ψ
M) where T( ) =
ˆ n(ξψH+ψL+µψM)
y(ψH,ψL,ψM) ≥ 0.29 (15)
Then τ(s) is plugged into the indirect utility function V i where fertility and private edu-
cation spending have been solved for parents with either schooling choices (see equations
(3), (4) and (5)). In this way, indirect utilities depend only on the policy variable s and
29The denominator of T( ) expresses the total production in terms of public participation rates:
y = y(ψH,ψL,ψM) > 0 (see Section 4.2).









ni = ˆ n and κi = s
ni = ˜ n and κi = ei
, i = {M,L,H}.
Next, we deﬁne ∆i = ˆ V i − ˜ V i, which is the net gain from choosing public education.
Therefore, at the equilibrium as deﬁned in deﬁnition 1, it must be that

    
    
ψi = 1 ⇔ ∆i(s,ψH,ψL,ψM) > 0
ψi ∈ [0,1] ⇔ ∆i(s,ψH,ψL,ψM) = 0
ψi = 0 ⇔ ∆i(s,ψH,ψL,ψM) < 0
, ∀i.




aﬀected by the socially determined quality of public school, s∗.
Lemma 3 (Opting-out and Participation Rates)
1. There exists a unique and feasible level of public school quality, ¯ si(ψH,ψL,ψM),
such that ∆i = 0, i.e. parents are indiﬀerent between public and private school.
2. For any s > [<]¯ si, all parents of type i send children to public [private] schools.
3. It holds: 0 < ¯ sM < ¯ sL < ¯ sH.
4. ψH > 0 ⇒ ψL = 1, ψL > 0 ⇒ ψM = 1;
ψL = 0 ⇒ ψH = 0, ψM = 0 ⇐⇒ (ψL = 0, ψH = 0).
















For ¯ si to be feasibly ﬁnanced via tax, it must be: ¯ si ∈ [0,1/T( )] such that τ(¯ si) ∈ [0,1].





s(1 − sT( ))
> 0, ∀ s ∈ [0,1/T(.)], (17)
or ∆i is monotonically increasing for all feasible s. Thus, ¯ si is unique. Equation (17)
also implies: ∆i > 0 iﬀ s > ¯ si, which proves point 2. Next, it is immediately observed
that ¯ si is positive and increasing in wi, which proves point (3). Point 4 follows from the
deﬁnition of ∆i, and points 2 and 3. The reverse direction of the last implication comes
from Lemma 2 that, if ψL = ψH = 0, τ∗ = 0 and consequently s∗ = 0. ￿
Figure 1: Critical level of public school quality




















25Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 3. The interpretation is that, if the quality of public school is
not satisfactorily high, parents will choose private schooling despite the costs incurred.
The motive behind lies in parents’ altruistic care for children’s human capital.30 More-
over, if public school quality continues to decline, high-skilled parents are those who
opt out ﬁrst, followed by low-skilled natives and then by immigrants. Thus, as point
4 states, whenever some parents of higher income choose public education, all parents
of lower income follow suit. Notice that there is no public school participation at all
below ¯ sL. This follows from the assumption that immigrants do not vote. In other
words, no natives would choose public education if they expect public school quality to
be below ¯ sL; consequently, natives then vote to have zero taxation, which disables public
education.
5 Education Regimes
In the previous section, we have deﬁned the equilibrium and shown the important prop-
erties at the equilibrium: Lemma 2 describes the voted policy for given participation
rates of public school, while Lemma 3 gives the participation rates that result from a
given policy. In order for a conﬁguration of {ψH,ψL,ψM,s∗,τ∗} to be an equilibrium
outcome, the participation rates and the voted policy must be reciprocally consistent.
Let us call an equilibrium conﬁguration as an education regime. In this section, we assess
whether and under which conditions a certain education regime exists.
Proposition 1 (Education Regime) There are four possible education regimes that
may exist:
30It can be easily shown that ¯ si is increasing in the taste for quality, η.
26Education Regime ψH ψL ψM s∗ τ∗
Public 1 1 1 s∗ > ¯ sH Γ
Partial Segregation ∈ [0,1] 1 1 s∗ = ¯ sH Γ(1+ξψH)
1+ξ
Segregation 0 1 1 s∗ ∈]¯ sL, ¯ sH[
Γ
1+ξ
Private 0 0 0 s∗ ≤ ¯ sL 0
Proposition 1 is a straightforward result derived from the combination of Lemmas 2 and
3. In Section 5.1, the existence conditions are computed for each education regime. The
eﬀects of low-skilled immigration are investigated within each regime, while the eﬀects
across regimes, i.e. how low-skilled immigration brings about changes in education
regime, will be discussed in Section 5.2.
5.1 Existence Conditions of Each Regime






. It can be considered as an exogenous
indicator for children’s quantity over quality: ι is monotonically decreasing in η.
Public Regime. In this regime, every child attends public school of high quality:
s∗ > ¯ sH (i.e. nobody opts out). By replacing ψH = ψL = ψM = 1 in (14) and in (16),
we recast the inequality representing no opting out into the existence condition:
wH
wL  
1 +   + ξ
wH
wL ξ + (1 + δ )











. The right-hand side (R.H.S.) is decreasing in η, the exogenous
taste for children’s human capital. When η is larger, it is more diﬃcult for the inequal-
ity to be satisﬁed and the public regime becomes less likely to exist. Intuitively, when
parents care more about child quality, they grow more willing to invest out-of-pocket in
27their education. On the left-hand side (L.H.S.) we can observe that low-skilled immi-
gration apparently has two eﬀects: an income eﬀect through the rise of wage premium
wH/wL and a direct demographic eﬀect that aﬀects the supply (via δ ) and the demand
(via  ) for public education.
In order to observe the demographic eﬀect more clearly, we rewrite the L.H.S. as





On one hand, low-skilled immigrants enlarge the total production, or the tax base:
y = (1−φˆ n)(wHξ+wl+wM ). On the other hand, however, immigrant children receive
public education and thus increase the number of public school pupils: ˆ n(1 +   + ξ).
The net demographic eﬀect is increased congestion in public school, as the average tax
base is in fact decreased and school resources per pupil decline in accordance. Therefore,
the demographic eﬀect narrows the gap between the voted public school quality and the
opt out threshold for the high-skilled. An analogous eﬀect is produced also through the
income eﬀect, as can be seen by examining equation (16).31 In short, an increase in low-
skilled immigration makes the public regime less likely to exist. (i.e.   ↑ ⇒ (s∗−¯ sH) ↓).
Partial Segregation Regime. In this regime, some high-skilled parents opt out of




(1 +  )[(1 + ξ)(1 + γ η) − γ η]
wH




1 +   + ξ
wH
wL ξ + (1 + δ  )
, (19)
31In equation (16), µ operates through the wage rate wi in an asymmetric way: it raises wH while
depressing wL and wM, which is a consequence of (imperfect) substitution in production. Since ¯ si
relates positively with wi, the wage eﬀect unambiguously increase the gap between ¯ sL, ¯ sM on one side
and ¯ sH on the other side. Literally speaking, it makes high-skilled parents more capable of aﬀording
private schooling whereas low-skilled parents become more dependent on publicly ﬁnanced education














Proof: Let us replace ψL = ψM = 1 into (14) and (16) and deﬁne the function
ΨH(ψH) ≡ (s∗ − ¯ sH). It can be easily veriﬁed that ΨH( ) is composed of a strictly posi-
tive part times a concave second-order polynomial. Hence, if the solution to ΨH( ) = 0
is stable, it must be identiﬁed by the larger root of the polynomial.32 Moreover, this
root must satisfy ψH ∈ [0,1] for the partial segregation regime to be an equilibrium.
The existence condition is then obtained. ￿
Notice that the upper bound corresponds to the lower bound of the public regime. As
the upper bound, the lower bound of the partial segregation regime is also aﬀected
by low-skilled immigration through the income and the demographic eﬀects. The net
demographic eﬀect (congestion in public school), as   increases, pushes more and more
high-skilled parents to opt out, and in so doing, they alleviate congestion such that
s∗ = ¯ sH is maintained. Eventually at the lower bound, all the high-skilled parents have
opted out and the partial segregation regime vanishes into the segregation regime. As far
as the income eﬀect is concerned, it increases the high-skill reward, and thus, high-skilled
parents desire better education quality. Moreover, it increases the opportunity cost of
child-rearing so that more high-skilled parents choose lower fertility with the anticipation
of private schooling, which drives down ψH. Hence, the income eﬀect reinforces the net
demographic eﬀect so that a greater   lifts the lower bound and makes the existence
condition more diﬃcult to be satisﬁed. Moreover, the upper bound rises with   but not
as fast as the lower bound; therefore, as   grows suﬃciently high, it becomes impossible
that both inequalities hold true at the same time. In other words, the existence condition
for the partial segregation regime can be regarded as a condition that   must not be too
32The intuition behind stability is that, since public school congestion is relieved with some pupils
opting out, there may be a threshold of ψH beyond which the quality of public school is no worse than
¯ sH, so that there is no further ﬂight into private education. Denoting ψH∗ as the stable root and ψH∗
′




Segregation Regime. In this regime, all the high-skilled parents opt out of public
school whereas every child with low-skilled parents continue to receive public education
with quality: s∗ ∈]¯ sL, ¯ sH[. By replacing ψH = 0 and ψL = ψM = 1 in (14) and in
(16), we can recast the school quality constraint into the existence condition for the
segregation regime:
(1 +  )[(1 + ξ)(1 + γ η) − γ η]
wH




(1 +  )[(1 + ξ)(1 + γ η) − γ η]
wH














. The net demographic eﬀect stays the same as before,
i.e. increased congestion in public school, which lowers public school quality s∗ and
brings it further away from ¯ sH and closer to ¯ sL. However, the income eﬀect is asymmetric
on the extremes: wH/wL increases the upper bound, making the complete opt out of
high-skilled parents more likely, while it decreases the lower bound because the reduced
low-skilled wage translates into higher dependence of the low-skilled parents on public
provision of education. Hence, the distance between the two extremes lengthens with
growing skill premium.
If the income eﬀect dominates, the segregation regime is likely to stay as the equilibrium
because low-skilled natives will never ﬁnd it aﬀordable to pay for private education with
quality higher than in public school. However, if congestion or the net demographic
eﬀect becomes dominant, i.e.   ↑ ⇒ (s∗ − ¯ sL) ↓, even the low-skilled natives who are
faced with a reduced wage will ﬁnd it more and more attempting to opt out of public
school since public resources per pupil are seriously degenerated.
Private Regime. In this regime, no children attend public school, and the voted public
school quality must satisfy s∗ ≤ ¯ sL. In order to check for the existence of the private
30regime, we replace ψi = 0, ∀i in (14) and obtain s∗ = 0. Since ¯ sL > 0 always hold
true, we have s∗ = 0 < ¯ sL and the private regime may exist at any positive level of
 .33 This is in fact a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. When all natives anticipate to opt out of
public school because of their low expectation for school quality, they choose to ﬁnance
their children’s education out of own pocket. Accordingly, in order to prevent a net
redistribution toward immigrants, natives vote not to be taxed.34










cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof: Replace ψH = 0 and ψM = 1 into (14) and (16) and then deﬁne the function
ΨL(ψL) ≡ (s∗−¯ sL). Following the same procedure in deriving condition (19), we obtain
the existence condition for this conﬁguration:
1 +
µ(1+ξ)(1+γ η)
γ η ≤ ι ≤
(1 +  )[(1 + ξ)(1 + γ η) − γ η]
wH
wL ξ (1 + γ η) + (1 + δ )
(21)
It can be easily shown that this condition is never satisﬁed since the lower bound is
always larger than the upper bound. Thus, this particular conﬁguration can not exist
as an equilibrium. ￿
Lemma 4 implies that, given all high-skilled natives having opted into private education,
all low-skilled natives will follow suit once one of them chooses to leave public school.
This is not a surprising result because, when low-skilled natives are indiﬀerent between
public and private schooling given a voted tax rate, they will be better oﬀ by choosing
33When there is no immigration, the private regime never arises since limψL→0 s∗|{µ=0,ψH=0} >
limψL→0 ¯ sL 
 
{µ=0,ψH=0}. This property is formally presented and discussed in de la Croix and Doepke
(2007).
34Note that this result stems from the assumption that immigrants cannot vote. An alternative
assumption is that low-skilled immigrants possess less political power than natives.
31private education and pay no tax. It is so since public school resources funded by tax
revenue are always shared by children of low-skilled immigrants.
With regard to fertility rates, we observe that in the (partial) segregation regime the
average fertility of the natives is lower than that of the immigrants, because high-skilled
native parents who opt out of public school have less children, as stated in Lemma
1. In the meantime, low-skilled parents who remain in public school choose the same
fertility rate as do low-skilled immigrants. To a certain degree, Kahn (1994) lends
support to this result. Using data from the U.S. Census and the Current Population
Survey, she concludes that, by the late 1980s, the standardized fertility levels of natives
and immigrants are virtually identical and that immigrants’ higher fertility rates are
owed to their group composition, in terms of demographic, socioeconomic and ethnic
characteristics. Our model further suggests that, keeping other things equal, the on
average higher fertility rate of immigrants may be the compounded outcome of their
lower income and public schooling choice.
5.2 Low-skilled Immigration and Regime Change
Now we will discuss how low-skilled immigration may cause changes of education regime
in the host country.
Proposition 2 (Regime Change) A suﬃciently large increase in the size of low-
skilled immigrants triggers native parents to opt out and lower public school participation,
i.e.
 
i ψi, i = {H,L,M}. Moreover, if the education regime does not jump immediately
to a private one in response to an increase in immigration, the change of regime follows
the direction of: public → (partial segregation →) segregation → private.
Proof: See Figure 2. ￿





















































(γ = 1, ξ = 0.6, α = 0.6, δ = 0.9)




wL ξ (1+γ η)+(1+δ µ)




wL ξ (1+γ η)+(1+δ µ)






33Suppose that an economy is characterized by a public regime when it opens its door
to low-skilled immigrants. With the demographic eﬀect of   that worsens public school
congestion and the income eﬀect which makes private education more aﬀordable to high-
skilled natives, we can expect that, as   grows beyond a certain size, there will be a
change into the partial segregation regime, or into the segregation regime when   is
suﬃciently large as shown in Figure 2.35
If wages are assumed to be constant, or there is only the demographic eﬀect, a further
increase in low-skilled immigration will deteriorate congestion in public school and induce
the education regime to change from public, then (partial segregation,) segregation and
ﬁnally end up in the private regime. However, when coupled with the income eﬀect, the
transition may linger at the segregation regime if   raises the skill premium by a large
degree and extends the lower bound of condition (20). In any case, we ﬁnd that the
income eﬀect is not essential to generate our theoretical predictions. Rather, it reinforces
the demographic eﬀect that leads to a more segregated education regime.
Comparing across all regimes, we ﬁnd that the tax rate is decreasing in native partici-
pation in public education, or
τ
∗



















Having known from Proposition 2 the direction of potential regime changes, we obtain
the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Decreasing Tax Rate) A suﬃciently large increase in the size of low-
skilled immigrants tends to lower the voted tax rate, τ∗.
35Notice that it is theoretically possible that the public regime jumps to a private one for any positive
level of µ. As shown in Section 3, however, we do not observe a pure private regime (i.e. zero public
education spending) in reality where minimum levels of provision of public education usually exist.
34This echoes the ﬁnding in Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) that low-skilled immigration
may be associated with less redistribution. However, instead of the ”ﬁscal leakage”
motive proposed in their paper, the trigger behind Corollary 1 is that high-skilled natives
who opt out of public school would like to minimize ”double taxation”, a phrase coined
to describe the situation where parents with children educated in private school also pay
for public education expenditures (via tax).
Furthermore, notice that we always have multiple equilibria since the existence con-
dition for the private regime is always satisﬁed as long as there are some low-skilled
immigrants. Moreover, within a certain range of  , an education regime may be either
public, segregated, or private. This multiplicity of equilibria arises from our assumption
that immigrants are not entitled to vote, i.e. immigration does not change the relative
size of high- and low-skilled voters. Finally, there is a strategic complementarity in
schooling choices among voters of the same type. When all the high-skilled parents an-
ticipate public schooling, the voted public school budget will be so high that no parents
ﬁnd it worth sending children to private school. Consequently, every child attends public
school. By the same token, when all the high-skilled parents anticipate private schooling,
the resulting budget for public education is low enough to induce high-skilled parents
to opt out of public schooling. In this case, whether the education regime ends up as a
segregated or a private one will depend on choices of the low-skilled native parents.36
5.3 Regime Ranking
Since multiple equilibria always exist in our model but natives do not coordinate and
decisions are made in a decentralized way, the realized regime may not be optimal in
36See de la Croix and Doepke (2007) for more discussion on strategic complementarity.
35terms of the aggregated welfare of all natives, i.e. Ω in equation (12). In this section,
we investigate the cardinal ranking of outcomes across regimes according to Ω.
We begin by pairwise ranking between the private regime and others because the pri-
vate regime can always exist with low-skilled immigration, . With constant wages, the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the private regime to weakly dominate the public
and the segregation regimes are respectively










































Therefore, if public school quality is lower than a certain threshold, the private regime
renders a higher level of aggregated native welfare when compared to the public (or
segregation) regime. Notice that the thresholds (R.H.S. of inequalities (22) and (23)) do
not depend on  , but   increases congestion and degenerates public school quality, s∗.
As a result, low-skilled immigration makes the private regime more likely to dominate
because, when public education exists, natives will have to spend part of their income to
subsidize the education of immigrant children, which does not help to improve natives’
welfare in our model and creates loss of eﬃciency. This is close to the spirit of ”ﬁscal
leakage” mentioned in Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002).
On the other hand, the private regime weakly dominates the partial segregation regime
requires the following condition:
ΩPRI ≥ ΩPSG iff
wH
wL ≤ (1 − τPSG)
−(1+ξ)
Γ . (24)
36That is, skill premium cannot be too large; otherwise, despite ﬁscal leakage, it is still
worth of redistributing through public education from high- to low-skilled natives, which
is a standard result of concave utility. With constant wages, it is found that an increased
number of low-skilled immigrants drives down the R.H.S. of inequality (24) since more
high-skilled parents will opt out and result in lower support to fund public education.
Although a lower tax rate alleviates eﬃciency loss, it also reduces the scale of redistri-
bution and makes the private regime less likely to dominate.37
Now, suppose a larger size of low-skilled immigration increases skill premium as speciﬁed
in Section 4.2. The eﬀect of an increasing   becomes two-folded: it worsens ﬁscal leakage
onto immigrants while redistribution between natives is more worthy. Juggled between
eﬃciency loss and equity concern, how   aﬀects the ranking of the private regime versus
others turns out to be ambiguous.
From earlier discussion and as illustrated by Figure 2, with some sets of parameters
(particularly with large  ), it is possible that an education system may end up in the
public, the segregation, or the private regime. With constant wages, the segregation
regime weakly dominates the public when the condition below holds true:






























While   only aﬀects public school quality s∗ in this inequality, it lowers both its L.H.S.
and R.H.S. at the same time and does not give a clear picture how low-skilled immigra-
tion aﬀects the ranking between the public and the segregation regimes.38 With a rising
37Using the existence conditions (18) and (20), it is found that w
H
wL ≤ (1 − τ)
−(1+ξ)
Γ is a necessary
condition for inequality (22) while it is a suﬃcient condition for inequality (23).
38Using the condition for these multiple equilibria to exist (i.e. B ≥ C in Figure 2), we ﬁnd that
the necessary condition for the segregation regime to oﬀer a higher level of aggregated native welfare
requires a low enough public school quality in the public regime, which is similar to conditions (22) and
37skill premium, however, the necessary and suﬃcient condition becomes:























Since an increasing in   drives up the L.H.S. and does not aﬀect the R.H.S., it makes the
segregation regime more likely to dominate the public one. This result is partly due to
our setting of quantity-quality trade-oﬀ; that is, in the segregation regime, high-skilled
parents choose to have less children and have more time devoted to work. Accordingly,
given the same size of low-skilled immigration, skill premium (and thus wage inequality)
is lower in the segregation than in the public regime. As   goes up and ﬁscal leakage
becomes so severe that it greatly reduces the eﬀective redistribution from high- to low-
skilled natives, segregation regime will then yield a higher level of aggregated native
welfare since it reduces eﬃciency loss and a lower skill premium makes redistribution
less worthy.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a political-economic model of joint education and fertility decisions
which relates low-skilled immigration and education system. In our framework, a larger
size of low-skilled immigration implies an expected reduction on the average tax base,
which has the eﬀect of decreasing public expenditures per pupil. In such a situation,
wealthier parents (i.e. high-skilled natives) prefer to invest in their children’s education
out of own pocket. Consequently, they opt out in favor of private school and consis-
tently vote for a lower tax rate in ﬁnancing public education. At the end, there may
(23) and is more likely to be satisﬁed with a large µ. However, this intuitive condition is not suﬃcient
due to equity reason (i.e. decline in the scale of redistribution).
38exist equilibria characterized by diﬀerent degrees of segregation featuring higher partic-
ipation rates (of children from the wealthier native households) in private school and
higher private share of education expenditure. This mechanism is strengthened when we
consider the increase in wage inequality brought by a larger supply of low-skilled labor
force.
In order to relate the theoretical predictions to empirical evidence, it should be borne in
mind that our model makes the simpliﬁcation that schools are funded entirely by either
public or private sources. In reality, many privately managed schools are subsidized by
the government while students attending public schools may still need to pay for certain
tuition fees. Therefore, the choice of private education has to be regarded as implying
that children of wealthier parents tend to attend, on average, schools with lower public
shares of funding. Moreover, the model assumes that parents make schooling decisions
for their children. This can be a generally realistic and safe assumption if the empirical
investigation is restricted to data concerning students attending primary and secondary
schools.
Recall the discussion in Section 3, the model’s predictions are not at odds with styl-
ized facts based on both micro and macro data; rather, those facts seem to support
the theoretical implications that low-skilled immigration is positively correlated with
private school participation rates and with the private share of education expenditures.
Moreover, the predicted positive correlation between low-skilled immigration and segre-
gation in education system is conﬁrmed by data as children from low-skilled immigrant
households are found to be more likely, on average, to attend schools with larger share
of public funding.
It is worth remarking that these main implications do not emerge from any exogenous
assumption on diﬀerences about preferences toward fertility or education among im-
39migrants and natives.39 In fact, the important assumption is that immigrants are not
entitled to vote, or less strictly, possess less political power. In reality, this assumption is
translated into the waiting period since the time of entry until obtaining full citizenship,
or the period when immigrants are restricted in their political participation. Depending
on the country speciﬁc regulations and on the category of immigration, it can take from
a few years to an indeﬁnite amount of time. Furthermore, this work is not meant to
take a position in the debate over open/close border, but rather to highlight the chan-
nels through which the education system in the destination countries can be aﬀected
by low-skilled immigration and rational responses of native voters caring for their own
children.
Our ﬁndings give rise to a number of concerns in a dynamic perspective which are not
considered in the present work due to the static framework of the model. For example, it
suggests that there will be more persistence in income inequality as the better educated
pupils are then more likely to acquire a higher-skill job. Actually, inequality may increase
even further as this process goes on. Moreover, the ranking of regimes based on the
aggregated native welfare can be arguably aﬀected when eﬃciency is considered in a
dynamic perspective. As Gradstein and Justman (2001) point out, public school can in
fact play an important role in promoting social integration and cultural assimilation of
immigrants, thus paving the way for greater cohesion in society, reducing social tensions
and preventing possible obstacles to economic growth and development.40 Such medium-
term beneﬁcial functions can become less and less eﬀective with a progressive process of
segregation. These issues seem to suggest a promising direction for future research to
39We have assumed a productivity gap between immigrants and natives low-skilled but it is not
essential for the main mechanism we put forward to work.
40Gradstein and Justman (2001) in this respect argues also that vouchers or public subsidies to private
education may increase the incentive of parents to opt out thus damaging the society as a whole. On
the other side, Epple and Romano (1998) claim that a voucher mechanism can favor a more eﬃcient
sorting and high ability students.
40extend our work in a dynamic framework.41
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44A Data Description
A.1 Macro Data: UNESCO and OECD
UNESCO data contains a list of educational variables that are of our interest. In order
to address the correlations between immigration and education outcomes, it is combined
with Docquier-Marfouk (2006) dataset on international migration by educational attain-
ment. This dataset features the advantage of including stocks of immigrants residing in
major destination countries and it allows to distinguish immigrants according to their
educational attainment.42 Nevertheless, UNESCO data contain some limitations. For
instance, they include in the category of private schools those that are publicly funded
but privately managed, whereas the diﬀerentiation that is of our interest lies essentially
in the source of funding. Moreover, both data on private share of education funding
and data on private education spending are not provided with suﬃcient completeness.43
For these reasons, we use a dataset created from the OECD data when developing the
analysis for the variables concerning privately funded schools (participation rate in pri-
vate school, private spending and share of private education expenditures), whilst we
use the UNESCO data for public expenditures per pupil (normalized as share of GDP
per capita).
The analysis is based on changes (i.e. diﬀerences44) rather than levels of the variables
42Precisely, the dataset distinguishes immigrants who have completed tertiary, secondary, or lass than
secondary education. Education can be used as a good - though imperfect - proxy of an immigrant’s
occupational skill. The following results are consistent with identiﬁcations of low-skilled immigrants
either as those immigrants with less than secondary education or as those immigrants with less than
tertiary education. Notice, however, that the deﬁnition of being an immigrant is not always consistent
in this dataset: sometimes as foreign-born and other times as citizenship holders.
43In particular, the absolute amount of private expenditures in education is not provided at all,
whereas data on private share of education funding are rounded to the ﬁrst decimal, so that there are
too few diﬀerent data values (two at the primary level and four at the secondary level) .
44For private expenditure per capita on education we use the growth rate as it is not normalized as
a share.
45in order to reduce the spurious eﬀect of country-speciﬁc time-invariant features and to
make more proper cross-country comparisons.45 The span of the interval over which the
changes in education variables are computed is taken as 5 years, from 1999 to 2004.46 We
take the variation in migration as slightly preceding that on education: i.e. the diﬀerence
in the ratio of immigrants over total population refers to periods preceding 2000. Doing
so allows both to mitigate the impact due to the reverse direction of causality and to be
more consistent with the timing structure of the model described in Section 4.
A.2 Micro Data: PISA 2003
PISA is an OECD program that conducts internationally standardized evaluation on
the knowledge and skills of 15-year-olds in schools. Two datasets produced in 2003 are
combined for our analysis. Data generated from the school questionnaire provides in-
formation on each sampled school, including shares of funding sources, public or private
management, and percentage of students who have a ﬁrst language other than the test
language used in school. Data originating from the student questionnaire identiﬁes the
school attended by the respondent and details his or her family background, includ-
ing foreign-born status of the student and of each parent, language spoken at home,
each parent’s occupation and educational attainment. The combined dataset covers 35
countries in total, 24 of them OECD members.47
45Other correlates could clearly continue to have an impact, but the main objective is to provide
stylized empirical evidence; isolating rigorously the single eﬀect of migration on education variables
would require a very careful econometric analysis and more sophisticated techniques.
46Due to data availability, we choose changes over 1999-2004 in order to obtain the largest number
of observations.
47Although there are 41 countries participating in PISA 2003, we ﬁnd missing data on the interested
variables for Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, we ﬁnd no Korean
student sample who satisﬁes our deﬁnition as an immigrant student.
46We identify three types of students by their immigration background and by their par-
ents’ occupational status.48 We deﬁne an immigrant student as one whose parents are
foreign-born. By this deﬁnition, we check that we include all samples who themselves are
also foreign-born. In comparison, native students refer to the native-born samples with
at least one native-born parent. With regard to parents’ occupational status, PISA oﬀers
two alternative measures. Both measures are coded based on each respondent’s descrip-
tion on his/her parent’s main job and job functions. The ﬁrst measure distinguishes four
classiﬁcations: white-collar high-skilled, white-collar low-skilled, blue-collar high-skilled
and blue-collar low skilled. The second measure maps each occupational code into the
International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al., 1992). In order to ﬁt the
occupational measure with the classiﬁcation in the model, we consider only the students
with at least one white-collar high-skilled parent as those with high-skilled parents and
others are students with low-skilled parents. Alternatively, students with at least one
parent who is assigned an above-national-sample-median ISEI are arbitrarily regarded
as those with high-skilled parents and others as students with low-skilled parents. Since
the results are very much consistent under both measures, we report only the statistics
produced with the ISEI alternative. Among the ﬁnal sample of 197,736 observations in
total, 5.89% are identiﬁed as immigrant students with low-skilled parents, 50.77% native
students with low-skilled parents and 43.34% native students with high-skilled parents.
48In the model, occupational skill is the synonym of productivity that directly aﬀects family earnings.
However, occupational status in reality only serves as a rough measure of household income, which is
not available in the PISA data. Notice that, for the purpose of this study, we disregard all samples of
immigrant students with high-skilled parents.
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−.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Change in foreign−born share of population
1990−2000. Data Source: World Bank
Correlation (p-value): −0.464∗∗ (.015).
Data for the U.S.A. are available only as public labeled school.
When plotted with diﬀerent lags and time-spans, the sign of correlation remains negative although
signiﬁcance can be lost. After the removal of the outlier (Austria), the sign is still unchanged and
signiﬁcance is sometimes maintained.

































































































































−.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Change in foreign−born share of population
1990−2000. Data Source: World Bank
Correlation (p-value): 0.309 (.184).
When plotted with diﬀerent lags and time-spans, the sign of correlation remains positive although
signiﬁcance is not always found.
















































































































































−.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Change in foreign−born share of population
1990−2000. Data Source: World Bank
Correlation (p-value): 0.614∗∗∗ (.007).
When plotted with diﬀerent lags and time-spans, the sign of correlation remains positive and signiﬁcant.
Note that Switzerland is not included for being a huge outlier.
50Figure 6: Change in public education expenditure per pupil vs change in low-skilled





























































































































































−.01 0 .01 .02 .03
Change in the low−skilled immigrant share of population
1990−2000. Data source: UNESCO
Correlation (p-value): −0.5209∗∗ (.0267).
After removing the outlier (Austria), the sign of correlation remains negative but signiﬁcance is lost.
51Figure 7: Distribution of countries by regime
(a) All countries
(b) Countries in the public and the segregation regimes
The variation of public shares of school funding is deﬁned as Smax−Smin
Smax , where Smax and Smin are
respectively the maximum and the minimum of the average public shares for all three types of students.
A hollow circle around a dot indicates that immigrant students with low-skilled parents do not have
the highest average public share of school funding. A hollow square indicates that native students with
high-skilled parents do not have the lowest average public share of school funding.
52Table 1: Means of foreign born share of population by groups of attendance rates in
public education
2000 2005
attendance rates mean of migrants’ attendance rates mean of migrants’
in public school share of populat. in public school share of populat.
(percentile groups) (percentile groups)
Lowest 13.156% Lowest 11.642%
Med-Low 8.916% Med-Low 10.226%
Med-High 7.811% Med-High 9.716%
Highest 6.566% Highest 7.868%
Table 2: Test of diﬀerence in means of foreign-born share of total population between
countries in diﬀerent regimes of public school attendance
Attendance Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Lowest 7 0.1315563 .0444336 .1175604 .0228312 .2402815
Highest 10 0.065661 .0189756 .0600062 .0227351 .1085868
combined 17 0.0927944 .02213 .0912445 .0458808 .139708
diﬀ 0.0658954 0.0432115 -.0262078 .1579986
diﬀ = mean(1) - mean(4) t = 1.5249
Ho: diﬀ = 0 d.o.f. = 15
Ha: diﬀ < 0 Ha: diﬀ  = 0 Ha: diﬀ > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9260 Pr(T > t) = 0.1481 Pr(T > t) = 0.0740
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions:
Smaller group D P-value Exact
1:00 0.1429 0.845
4:00 -0.5571 0.078
Combined K-S: 0.5571 0.155 0.117
53Table 3: Test of diﬀerence in mean of low-skilled foreign-born share of total population
between countries with in- and decreases in public expenditures per pupil (% of GDP
per capita)
Primary School
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Increase 16 0.002655 0.0011965 0.004786 0.0001047 0.0052052
Decrease 3 0.0109911 0.0066701 0.0115529 -0.0177079 0.0396902
combined 19 0.0039712 0.0015161 0.0066084 0.000786 0.0071563
diﬀ -0.0083362 0.0037704 -0.0162909 -0.0003814
diﬀ=mean(0)-mean(1) t = -2.2110
Ho: diﬀ = 0 d.o.f.=17
Ha: diﬀ < 0 Ha: diﬀ! =0 Ha: diﬀ > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0205 Pr(T > t)= 0.0410 Pr(T > t) = 0.9795
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions:
Smaller group D P-value Exact
0: 0.5625 0.202
1: 0.0000 1.000
Combined K-S: 0.5625 0.401 0.303
Secondary School
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
Increase 13 0.0022638 0.0014589 0.0052603 -0.0009149 0.0054426
Decrease 6 0.0076705 0.0033368 0.0081735 -0.000907 0.012648
combined 19 0.0039712 0.0015161 0.0066084 0.000786 0.0071563
diﬀ -0.0054067 0.0036418 -0.0140211 0.0032078
diﬀ=mean(0)-mean(1) t = -1.4846
Ho: diﬀ = 0 Satterthwaite’s d.o.f.=6.988
Ha: diﬀ < 0 Ha: diﬀ! =0 Ha: diﬀ > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0906 Pr(T > t)= 0.1813 Pr(T > t) = 0.9094
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions:
Smaller group D P-value Exact
0: 0.6923 0.020
1: -0.0641 0.967
Combined K-S: 0.6923 0.039 0.011
54Table 4: Average public shares of school funding by student type






Public Czech Republic 95.947868 94.455482 94.491226
(1.49884) (0.75120) (0.95114)
Finland 99.705894 99.859612 99.76329
(0.21604) (0.06989) (0.12451)
Hong Kong, China 90.362579 90.300293 89.101669
(0.71049) (0.76235) (1.03829)
Hungary 89.461647 90.797348 91.828087
(1.74355) (0.96053) (1.04546)
Iceland 99.951324 99.82151 99.497459
(0.04844) (0.04090) (0.10513)
Latvia 97.44603 96.811264 95.309799
(0.84557) (0.53616) (1.32920)
Luxembourg 98.262581 97.684868 97.727051
(0.15186) (0.17642) (0.14725)
Netherlands 95.499214 95.30101 95.734619
(0.78485) (0.72313) (0.52036)
Norway 99.6166 99.696068 99.591499
(0.26743) (0.20762) (0.26739)
Poland 95 97.005188 94.845886
(0.00000) (0.43540) (0.79274)
Russian Federation 92.18248 92.281113 91.347771
(1.54375) (1.10452) (1.39742)
Serbia and Montenegro 92.439629 93.723763 93.995689
(1.25150) (0.87957) (0.63648)
Slovak Republic 93.032448 91.837425 93.303055
(2.64327) (0.90203) (0.76817)
Sweden 99.468834 99.914383 99.75779
(0.29455) (0.03420) (0.13790)
55Segregation Belgium 92.970215 89.557091 86.785774
Regime (1.09799) (0.91271) (1.13165)
Canada 93.834282 92.389626 89.493698
(0.73521) (0.51115) (0.84146)
Denmark 96.998848 92.920151 92.788795
(1.18401) (0.88155) (1.29765)
Germany 97.919785 96.71534 94.55452
(0.49344) (0.50523) (0.77876)
Greece 91.242668 89.450066 85.663513
(1.30087) (1.27673) (3.58973)
Ireland 95.617073 95.129005 90.606308
(1.04415) (0.50559) (1.41699)
Japan 72.268036 76.384232 70.925522
(8.43649) (1.41331) (1.91171)
Liechtenstein 99.966019 95.998367 94.248375
(0.01923) (0.86398) (1.07504)
New Zealand 77.494125 80.100792 76.031754
(1.25158) (0.86149) (1.14851)
Portugal 86.659126 85.87606 81.260452
(3.08535) (1.65654) (2.58895)
Switzerland 98.901016 96.968895 92.92453
(0.33304) (0.48104) (1.36581)
United States 92.208778 88.422775 85.61586
(1.82975) (1.76358) (2.41584)
Severely Australia 73.738464 76.311218 65.669144
Segregated (1.22751) (0.91294) (1.29929)
Brazil 98.669655 88.048607 65.418968
(0.84375) (1.45130) (4.23931)
Thailand 100.000000 87.511017 76.087975
(0.00002) (1.55778) (1.99347)
Tunisia 66.404343 68.561096 75.390099
56(7.35852) (1.64594) (1.03259)
Uruguay 86.23951 88.014587 66.863541
(5.97201) (1.15223) (2.19179)
Private Indonesia 21.599062 33.002502 33.966629
Regime (9.97910) (2.08754) (2.65803)
Macao, China 53.021244 45.711414 38.762604
(0.83486) (2.45105) (1.69494)
Mexico 42.020725 42.115124 34.941616
(8.07494) (3.40941) (2.74917)
Turkey 47.327709 57.608212 51.505253
(9.59675) (2.55671) (3.47479)
The associated stand errors on the mean are included in the parentheses.
57Table 5: Correlation between the segregation regime and low-skilled immigration
Low-skilled immigrants as those with less than secondary education
Regime Change in average stock Average stock ratio (in proportion Change in average stock ratio
1990-2000 to the total population) in 2000 1990-2000
Public -39784.49 1.97794% -0.05711%
Segregation 383054.60 3.14551% 0.42906%
Correlation with 0.2740 0.2854 0.5383∗∗
Segregation
Low-skilled immigrants as those with less than tertiary education
Regime Change in average stock Average stock ratio (in proportion Change in average stock ratio
1990-2000 to the total population) in 2000 1990-2000
Public 2664.21 3.90396% 0.57015%
Segregation 564021.90 5.21762% 0.77263%
Correlation with 0.2441 0.2042 0.1336
Segregation
20 country observations.
∗∗: at the 0.05 signiﬁcance level.
For the average stock ratio in 2000, we alternatively conduct a test of proportions, using the pooled immigrant share of each regime. It is found
that the pooled ratio of the segregation regime (2.77127% with the ﬁrst measure of the low-skilled; otherwise 4.12529%) is signiﬁcantly higher,
at the 0.01 level, than the ratio of the public regime (2.01763% with the ﬁrst measure of the low-skilled; otherwise 3.4616%). However, these
ratios have the problem of being dominated by large countries.
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